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Abstract
We provide a novel justication for a nancial transaction tax for economies where agents
face stochastic consumption opportunities. A nancial transaction tax makes it more costly
for agents to readjust their portfolios of liquid and illiquid assets in response to liquidity
shocks, which increase both the demand for and the price of liquid assets. The higher price
improves liquidity insurance and welfare for other market participants. We calibrate the
model to U.S. data and nd that the optimal nancial transaction tax is 1.6 percent and that
it reduces the volume of nancial trading by 17 percent.
1 Introduction
A nancial transaction tax (FTT) is a proportional tax on nancial transactions. One of the early
advocates was Tobin (1978) who proposed it in order to add some frictions to the excessively
e¢ cient international money markets(p. 154). Although Tobins proposal was a proportional
tax on currency transactions, the term Tobin tax is commonly used today for a proportional
tax levied on any nancial asset transaction.
The existing theoretical literature on FTTs focuses mainly on historical episodes or provides
the basic intuition in favor of or against such a tax. Although this literature discusses many
dynamic issues such as price volatility and liquidity in nancial markets, the analysis is most
often static. Furthermore, none of these papers studies the underlying frictions that give rise to
the need for nancial transactions in the rst place, and the reader is left puzzled about what
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distortion an FTT is intended to correct. Finally, very few studies o¤er a rigorous analysis of the
welfare implications of FTTs.
Building on recent advances in monetary theory, we can now address these shortcomings by
building a choice-theoretic dynamic general equilibrium model with frictions that make nancial
trading essential.1 The model allows us to address important positive and normative questions
regarding the impact of an FTT on the real economy: For example, under which conditions is
an FTT desirable and what distortion is corrected by such a tax? More generally, what is the
optimal FTT and how does it a¤ect trading volumes in nancial markets?
In our model, agents face idiosyncratic random consumption and production opportunities,
and they hold a portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets. The liquid asset can be directly traded for
consumption goods if a consumption opportunity arises; i.e., it serves as a medium of exchange.
In contrast, the illiquid asset cannot be used as a medium of exchange.2 From the agentspoint of
view, the random consumption and production opportunities are liquidity shocks. These shocks
generate an ex-post ine¢ cient allocation of the medium of exchange: Some agents will hold liquid
assets, but have no current need for them, while other agents will hold insu¢ cient liquidity for
their liquidity needs. To mitigate this liquidity mismatch, a nancial market opens that allows
the exchange of illiquid assets for liquid assets. The nancial market is an over-the-counter (OTC)
market, where agents are matched in pairs and the terms of trades are bargained.
Our main nding is that the portfolio choice of liquid and illiquid assets displays a pecuniary
externality which results in an ine¢ ciently low demand for the liquid asset. The reason for the
pecuniary externality is that an agent does not account for the fact that, by holding more liquid
assets, he not only acquires additional insurance against his own idiosyncratic liquidity risks,
but that he also marginally increases the value of the liquid asset, which improves the insurance
for other market participants, too. This pecuniary externality can be corrected by an FTT. By
making it more costly to readjust a portfolio in response to liquidity shocks, agents attempt to
hold more of the liquid asset ex ante. The resulting increase in the demand for liquid assets
drives up the value of these assets, and this e¤ect can be so strong that it is welfare-increasing.3
To provide a quantitative assessment for the optimal FTT, we calibrate the model to U.S.
data. For the calibration, we assume that the FTT is zero. We then perform the following
experiment: We search numerically for the tax rate that maximizes welfare. We nd that for the
United States, the optimal tax rate is 1:6 percent and that the optimal tax rate reduces the real
volume of nancial trading by 17 percent. As a robustness check, we also calibrate the model to
Germany and nd that the optimal tax rate is 1:5 percent.
The optimal rate of an FTT mainly depends on the nancial market characteristics, which
are captured in an OTC market by the matching probability and the bargaining power. For
example, we nd that the optimal tax rate decreases monotonically in the matching probability.
1These frictions include a lack of record-keeping (public communication of individual trading histories) and a
lack of commitment. By essential, we mean that nancial trading improves the allocation.
2 It has been shown by Kocherlakota (2003) that an arrangement with illiquid bonds is e¢ cient. See also
Berentsen and Waller (2011) for a discussion on the societal benets of illiquid bonds. We provide a short discussion
of this result in Section 7.
3The pecuniary externality arises in the steady state equilibrium.
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Furthermore, as the bargaining power of the agents who demand liquidity increases, the optimal
tax rate increases.
FTT rates vary substantially and range from 0:1 percent in the European Union to 2 percent
in the United States and Switzerland. The European Commission intends to introduce an FTT
on the exchange of shares and bonds of 0:1 percent. The proposal is supported by eleven member
states and is scheduled to be introduced in 2016. In the United States, the recent reform of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, e¤ective as of 14 October 2014, allows money market
funds to impose an exit fee of up to 2 percent. This so-called liquidity fee can be imposed if the
funds liquid assets fall below a pre-specied threshold. Similar regulatory changes have been
imposed by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority. Since 1 January 2015, a fee on
early redemptions of time deposits of at least 2 percent has been levied.
Our nding of an optimal FTT of 1:6 percent for the United States or 1:5 percent for Germany
is likely to be an upper bound for the optimal FTT, since, by construction, in our paper an
FTT has no negative e¤ects on the primary market and, for example, investment decisions.
Furthermore, our model is a closed economy, where agents cannot avoid the FTT by moving to
asset markets that have no or a lower FTT. In practice, nancial investors have many choices at
home and abroad and this will constrain the introduction of FTTs. An open economy, however,
does not imply that an FTT will drive away all asset trading. For example, in Switzerland,
the tax authority charges a stamp tax (an FTT) equal to 0:15 percent for each transaction in
domestically issued CHF bonds and a stamp tax equal to 0:3 percent for each transaction in
foreign issued CHF bonds. Even though these rates are considerably smaller than the optimal
rates we nd for the United States and Germany, the tax income generated by the Swiss stamp
duty is large. For Switzerland in 2010, it generated 4.5 percent of the entire federal tax income.4
Our main nding is obtained in a model that belongs to a class of models that is by now labeled
the new monetarist economics. This literature originated with the seminal paper by Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989).5 Our version is based on Lagos and Wright (2005) and Berentsen et al.
(2007). In these new generation models, the Friedman rule is the optimal monetary policy. The
Friedman rule maximizes the return on the liquid asset (money) and addresses the problem of an
ine¢ ciently low value of money more directly than an FTT. Our paper, therefore, solves a second-
best problem in which an FTT can improve welfare away from the Friedman rule. Implementing
the Friedman rule, however, requires taxation, since tax income is needed to subsidize the liquid
asset. In many monetary models, lump-sum taxation is available and so the necessary funds
to implement the Friedman rule can be levied with a nondistortionary tax instrument. If such
an instrument is available, enhancing the return on money as proposed by the Friedman rule is
clearly a better policy than an FTT. In practice, however, nondistortionary taxation may not be
available, and a government must resort to distortionary taxation to subsidize the rate of return
on the liquid asset. In this case, a well-designed FTT can be a better policy.
It is well-known that a pecuniary externality is a pricing externality. In an incomplete markets
setting, the equilibrium might not be constrained-e¢ cient, and government intervention can be
4The stamp duty is levied on many nancial products including insurance contracts, stocks, bonds and other
nancial instruments.
5For a discussion of this literature, see Williamson and Wright (2010a and 2010b).
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welfare-improving. In our incomplete market model, there are two pecuniary externalities. First,
when agents acquire money they incur disutility today, but spending and hence consumption
utility occurs in the future. Since agents discount future utilities, they typically underinvest in
money, which results in a value of money that is too low, or, equivalently, a price level that is
too high. This is a well-known pecuniary externality that is present in the most basic version
of the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework. We therefore exstend this basic setting by adding
the opportunity to trade liquid for illiquid assets after the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks have
occurred. This opportunity reduces the value of money even more, since, as explained above, it
reduces the demand for money and hence its value. This second pecuniary externality can be
corrected by an FTT.
2 Literature
Our paper studies a similar environment as Berentsen et al. (2014). The key nding in this
paper is that restricting access to nancial markets can be welfare-improving. Here, we nd that
an FTT can improve the allocation. In both papers, the reason is the presence of a pecuniary
externality that arises when agents choose their portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets. There are
some important di¤erences, however. First, Berentsen et al. (2014) show that adding trading
frictions into an otherwise frictionless competitive market can be welfare-enhancing. In the
current paper, we show that trading frictions are necessary for the welfare benets of an FTT.
In particular, we nd that in the absence of trading frictions, an FTT is not welfare-improving.
Second, the mechanism at work is di¤erent. In Berentsen et al. (2014), restricting access to a
competitive nancial market increases consumption variability across agents. In contrast, in this
paper an FTT reduces consumption variability. Third, it might not be feasible to restrict access
to nancial markets, while imposing an FTT is straightforward. In particular, in Berentsen et
al. (2014) access to the nancial market is determined randomly, and it is not clear how this can
be implemented with nancial regulations.
In our model, trading frictions are necessary for the welfare-enhancing e¤ects of an FTT. To
capture these frictions, we assume that our nancial market is an OTC market, as introduced into
the theoretical nance literature by Du¢ e et al. (2005).6 Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2016)
also develop a model where agents can trade assets of di¤erent liquidity in an OTC market. They
nd that trading in a frictional asset market, as opposed to trading in a competitive asset market,
can be welfare-improving. The policy implication is that removing frictions, say by moving from
a frictional asset market (OTC-market) to a centrally organized exchange, as often discussed in
the aftermath of the nancial crisis, can be welfare-decreasing.
6Recent contributions on OTC markets in this literature include papers by Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), Lagos
et al. (2011), and Rocheteau and Wright (2013). Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) extend Du¢ e et al. (2005) by
imposing no restrictions on asset holdings. This allows them to capture the heterogeneous response of agents
to changes in market conditions. Lagos et al. (2011) study e¢ ciency of liquidity provisions and government
intervention in OTC markets during crises. Rocheteau and Wright (2013) study endogenous agents participation
and nonstationary equilibria in OTC markets.
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Our framework is part of the rapidly expanding literature labeled the new monetarist eco-
nomics.The rst paper in this literature that incorporated idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and
trading in nancial markets is Berentsen et al. (2007). Many more recent papers also add liq-
uidity shocks and nancial trading.7 However, none of these papers studies the FTT and its
implications on welfare. It is also related to the macroeconomic literature on overborrowing.8
In this literature, agents do not take into account how their borrowing decisions a¤ect collateral
prices (a pecuniary externality), and through them the borrowing constraints of other agents. As
a consequence, the equilibrium is characterized by overborrowing, which leads to credit booms
and busts. Our paper di¤ers from this literature, because it is not a model of crisis. The pecu-
niary externality is present in the unique steady-state equilibrium. Furthermore, the pecuniary
externality emerges from the portfolio choices and not from borrowing decisions.
There are also many attempts to assess the e¤ects of FTTs empirically. The main issue in
this literature is whether an FTT increases or reduces volatility in nancial markets. The results
from this literature are ambiguous.9
To our knowledge, only three papers have so far investigated the implications of an FTT
on welfare:10 Subrahmanyam (1998), Dow and Rahi (2000) and Dávila (2015). Subrahmanyam
(1998) develops a two-period rational expectations model with noisy observations using the Kyle
(1985) framework. Subrahmanyam shows that a transaction tax on nancial transactions reduces
an agents incentive to acquire information before others do so, and eventually increases welfare.
The main argument proposed by Subrahmanyam is that agents spend too much e¤ort on infor-
mation acquisition. A policy that induces agents to reduce trading, such as a transaction tax,
can be socially benecial. Dow and Rahi (2000) study the welfare e¤ects of a transaction tax in
a model with informed and uninformed agents. They show that a tax on transactions made by
informed agents can be benecial both for them and for the uninformed agents. They also show
that these results apply when the tax is levied on all transactions, instead of on transactions
made by uninformed agents only. Dávila (2015) studies an FTT in a model with belief disagree-
ment. He shows that, when heterogeneous beliefs induce investors to trade too much, it is always
optimal to levy an FTT.
7There is a rapidly growing literature that studies liquidity shocks and nancial intermediation in the Lagos-
Wright (2005) framework. A sample of these papers are Berentsen and Monnet (2008), Geromichalos and Herren-
brueck (2016), Li (2011), Li and Li (2013), Chiu et al. (2012 and 2016), Chiu and Monnet (2014), and Williamson
(2012). Other papers that specically study OTC markets in this literature are Geromichalos et al. (2016), Lagos
and Zhang (2015), and Mattesini and Nosal (2016). For a mechanism design approach to nancial intermediation,
see Gu et al. (2013a).
8See, for example, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003), Lorenzoni (2008), Bianchi and Mendoza (2011), Jeanne
and Korinek (2012), Korinek (2012) and Moore (2013). For a more detailed discussion of this literature, see
Berentsen et al. (2014).
9See Pomeranets (2012) for a detailed discussion of these studies.
10There are other theoretical contributions, but they are all concerned with excessive speculation. Our paper is
concerned with e¢ cient trade in a monetary economy.
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3 Environment
Time is discrete and, in each period, there are three markets that open and close sequentially.
The rst market is an over-the-counter (OTC) secondary bond market, where agents are matched
pairwise and trade money for nominal bonds. The second market is a competitive goods market,
where agents produce or consume market-2 goods. The third market is a frictionless market,
where all agents consume and produce market-3 goods, all nancial contracts are redeemed, and
new bonds are issued. We label these markets as secondary bond market, goods market, and
primary bond market, respectively. All goods are perfectly divisible, and nonstorable in the sense
that they cannot be carried from one market to the other.
The economy is populated by a [0; 1]-continuum of innitely lived agents. At the beginning
of each period, each agent receives an idiosyncratic i.i.d. preference/technology shock that de-
termines whether she is a producer or she is a consumer in the goods market. With probability
n 2 (0; 1), she can produce but not consume, and with probability 1   n, she can consume but
not produce. This shock is introduced in order to obtain a liquidity mismatch and hence a role
for asset trading in the secondary bond market.11
In the goods market, trading is competitive: Agents take the price of market-2 goods as given
and the price clears the market.12 A consumer enjoys utility u (q) from q consumption, where
u (q) has the standard properties; i.e., u0 (q) > 0 > u00 (q), u0 (0) =1, and u0 (1) = 0. Producers
incur a utility cost c(q) from q production in the goods market. For ease of exposition, we assume
linearity of the cost function; i.e., c(q) = q.
In the primary bond market, all agents can produce and consume using a linear production
technology. In particular, agents can use h units of time to produce h units of market-3 goods.
The utility of consuming x units of goods is U(x) where U 0 (x) > 0 > U 00 (x), U 0 (0) = 1, and
U 0 (1) = 0. Agents discount between, but not within, periods. The discount factor between two
consecutive periods is  = 1=(1 + r), where r > 0 represents the real interest rate. It is routine
to show that the rst-best quantities satisfy U 0(x) = 1 and u0(q) = 1.
There are two perfectly divisible, storable objects: money and nominal bonds. Both money
and bonds are intrinsically useless, and are issued by the central bank in the primary bond
market. Bonds are issued at discount, and one unit of bonds pays one unit of money in the next-
period primary bond market. The central bank has a record-keeping technology over nancial
transactions. Bonds are intangible objects, and the central bank operates the primary and
secondary bond markets and keeps track of ownership. This also allows for the imposition of an
FTT.
Trading in the goods market requires a medium of exchange. The frictions that make the
use of a medium of exchange in the goods market necessary are specialization in production and
11This liquidity shock was introduced in Berentsen et al. (2007). In their model, nancial intermediation emerges
endogenously to mitigate the liquidity mismatch generated by these shocks.
12 In an earlier version of the paper, agents were subject to search and bargaining frictions in this market as well.
Assuming competitive pricing has three implications: First, it eliminates the mark-up ine¢ ciency that arises when
agents bargain over the terms of trade. Second, it simplies the theoretical part of the paper considerably. Third,
it does not a¤ect the qualitative result in an important way. For a more exhaustive analysis of di¤erent trading
protocols in the goods market, see Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
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consumption, limited commitment, and a lack of record-keeping.13 In our model, only money can
serve as a medium of exchange. The reason is that bonds are intangible objects, and so they are
incapable of being used as a medium of exchange in the goods market; hence, they are illiquid.
Therefore, money is the only means of payment in the goods market.14
In the secondary bond market, agents meet according to a matching functionM [n;  (1  n)],
where the parameter  is a scaling variable, which determines the e¢ ciency of the matching
process. We assume thatM has constant returns to scale, and is continuous and increasing with
respect to each of its arguments. The probability of a meeting for a consumer and a producer
are then   M (n; 1  n) (1   n) 1 and p   (1  n)n 1, respectively. Once in a meeting,
the consumer and producer bargain over the quantity of money and bonds to be exchanged.
Specically, terms of trade in the secondary bond market are determined according to Kalai
bargaining. We refer to agents who are matched in this market as active, and to those who are
not as passive.
Let Mt be the per-capita stock of money and Bt the per-capita stock of newly issued bonds
at the end of period t. Let t denote the price of bonds in the primary bond market. Then, the
law of motion of money in period t is given by
Mt  Mt 1 = T +Bt 1   tBt   Tb: (1)
The change in the stock of money at time t,Mt Mt 1, is a¤ected by four components: the lump-
sum money injection (T > 0) or withdrawal (T < 0), the money created to redeem previously
issued bonds, Bt 1, the money withdrawn from selling newly issued bonds, tBt; and the revenues
from the FTT in the secondary bond market, Tb.15 We assume that there is a strictly positive
initial stock of money and bonds; i.e., M0; B0 > 0.
4 Agents Decisions
For notational simplicity, the time subscript t is omitted from now on. Next-period variables
are indexed by +1, and previous-period variables are indexed by  1. In what follows, we study
the agentsdecisions beginning in the last market (the primary bond market) and then move
backwards within a period to the goods market, and nally to the secondary bond market.
13The essential role of a medium of exchange has been studied, for example, by Kocherlakota (1998) and Wallace
(2001). Sanches and Williamson (2010) show that an economy with no memory and monetary exchanges may
achieve the same equilibrium allocation as an economy with perfect memory and private credit. Limited commit-
ment is important for this result. In a similar fashion, Gu et al. (2013a and 2013b) study issues related to banking
and credit.
14An alternative arrangement that would render bonds illiquid is if they can be counterfeited at no cost (Li et
al. 2012).
15The total amount of tax revenues from FTTs are Tb = 
Z
dm(i)di where dm(i) denotes the amount of money
exchanged in the i-th meeting in the secondary bond market and  is the FTT. We will see that, in a symmetric
equilibrium, dm(i) = dm, and since there are (1  n)  meetings in the secondary bond market, and trade always
occurs in a meeting, then Tb = dm (1  n) .
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4.1 Primary bond market
In the primary bond market, previous-period bonds are redeemed and agents choose a portfolio of
money and newly issued bonds by producing and consuming market-3 goods. An agent entering
the primary bond market with m units of money and b units of bonds has the indirect utility
function V3(m; b). His decision problem is
V3(m; b) = arg max
x;h;m+1;b+1
[U(x)  h+ V1(m+1; b+1)] ; (2)
subject to
x+ m+1 + b+1 = h+ m+ b+ T: (3)
The rst-order conditions with respect to m+1, b+1 and x are
@V1
@m+1
=  1
@V1
@b+1
= ; (4)
and U 0(x) = 1, respectively. The term @V1@m+1

@V1
@b+1

is the marginal benet of taking one
additional unit of money (bonds) into the next period, while  () is the marginal cost. Due to
the quasi-linearity of preferences, the choices of b+1 and m+1 are independent of b and m. It is
straightforward to show that all agents exit the primary bond market with the same portfolio of
bonds and money. The envelope conditions in the primary bond market are
@V3
@m
=
@V3
@b
= : (5)
According to (5), the marginal value of money and bonds at the beginning of the primary bond
market is equal to the price of money in terms of market-3 goods. Note that (5) implies that the
value function V3 is linear in m and b.
4.2 Goods market
In the goods market, consumers consume and producers produce the market-2 good. Terms of
trade are determined by competitive pricing in this market. Denote p the competitive price for
market-2 goods.
Let V p2 (m; b) be the value function of a producer entering the goods market with m units of
money and b units of bonds. His problem is to choose the amount of production, qp, such that
his lifetime utility is maximized; i.e.,
V p2 (m; b) = maxqp
 qp + V3 (m+ pqp; b) :
The rst-order condition for a producer in the goods market is 1=p = @V3=@m. Using (5), the
rst-order condition can be rewritten as
1 = p: (6)
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Envelope conditions are
@V p2
@m
=
@V p2
@b
= ; (7)
where, again, we have used (5).
Let V c2 (m; b) be the value function of a consumer entering the goods market with m units of
money and b units of bonds. Then, his problem in the goods market is
V c2 (m; b) = maxqc
u (qc) + V3 (m  pqc; b) ;
subject to m  pqc  0. Let  be the Lagrange multiplier for this constraint. A consumer in the
goods market decides how much to consume, qc, taking the price of the market-2 good as given,
and subject to the constraint that he cannot spend more money than he has. Using (5) and (6),
the rst-order condition satises
u0 (qc) = + : (8)
From (8), consumption is e¢ cient, u0 (qc) = 1, if the consumer does not spend all his money in the
goods market; i.e.,  = 0. In contrast, consumption is ine¢ cient, u0 (qc) > 1; if the consumers
cash constraint binds. The envelope conditions for a consumer in the goods market are
@V c2
@m
= u0 (qc) and
@V c2
@b
= : (9)
All the expressions above hold for any agent entering the goods market with a portfolio (m; b)
of assets. In the next subsection, we show that active agents and passive agents enter the goods
market with a di¤erent portfolio. This generates consumption heterogeneity in this market.
4.3 Secondary bond market
In the secondary bond market, consumers and producers are matched pairwise, and the gains
from trade are split according to the proportional bargaining solution, introduced by Kalai (1977).
To derive the terms of trade, one can consider the case where the consumer chooses the terms of
trade in order to maximize his payo¤ subject to the constraint that the producer receives a given
fraction of the total surplus (see Aruoba et al., 2007). In particular, he chooses the quantities
(dm; db), where dm is the quantity of money he receives for db units of bonds.
Transactions in the secondary bond market are subject to a proportional tax  . If the producer
accepts the o¤er, db units of bonds and dm units of money change hands, and the consumer pays
dm units of money to the government. We assume that the government operates the secondary
bond market and as such can perfectly enforce tax payment. Participation in the secondary bond
market is voluntary so that agents always have the option to avoid the tax by not trading. This
contrasts with the scenario for a lump-sum tax where the assumption of perfect enforcement
means that agents always have to pay it.16
16Andolfatto (2013) studies the case where lump-sum taxation must satisfy participation constraints, which
limits the governments ability to run the Friedman rule.
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The consumers problem in a match in the secondary bond market is
max
dm;db
c
subject to
(1  ) c  p;
b  db  0;
m  dm  0;
where  2 [0; 1] is the consumers bargaining weight in a meeting, and c and p are the
consumers and producers net surplus. The rst constraint in the consumers problem is the
Kalai constraint. The second constraint means that a consumer cannot deliver more bonds than
he has, and the third constraint means that a producer cannot deliver more money than she has.
In the Appendix, we derive expressions forc andp. Using these expressions, the consumers
problem in the secondary bond market can be rewritten as follows:17
max
dm;db
[u (q^c)  u (qc)]  db
subject to
db  (1  ) [u (q^c)  u (qc)] + dm;
b  db;
m  dm;
where q^c and qc are the consumption quantities of an active consumer and passive consumer,
respectively. The rst constraint is again the Kalai constraint. In any equilibrium, it has to hold
with equality, and it is therefore convenient to solve it for db to obtain
db = (1  ) [u (q^c)  u (qc)] + dm: (10)
Use (10) to eliminate db from the objective function and the second inequality, and rewrite the
consumers problem as follows:
max
dm
 f[u (q^c)  u (qc)]  dmg (11)
17The solution to this problem always satises the producers participation constraint, p  0. In contrast, the
consumers participation constraint, c  0, may not be satised. This is, in particular, the case if the tax is high
and/or ination low, which reduces the benets from having the secondary bond market. In this case, there is no
trading and the market shuts down. In what follows, we assume that the tax (or the ination) is such that there
is trading, and later on we verify under which conditions c  0.
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subject to
b  (1  ) [u (q^c)  u (qc)]  dm  0; (12)
m  dm  0: (13)
Note that the expression in the curly bracket in the objective function is the total surplus of the
match p + c. Thus, the Kalai proportional solution maximizes the total surplus and is hence
e¢ cient.
Denote c and p the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (12) and (13), respectively. As
we will demonstrate, the nature of the equilibrium will depend on whether these constraints are
binding or not. The rst-order condition in the secondary bond market is


u0 (q^c)
@q^c
@dm
  

  c

(1  )u0 (q^c) @q^c
@dm
+ 

  p = 0: (14)
Finally, the value function in the primary bond market satises
V1 (m; b) = nV
p
1 (m; b) + (1  n)V c1 (m; b) ; (15)
where
V c1 (m; b) = V^
c
2 (m+ dm (1  ) ; b  db) + (1  )V c2 (m; b) (16)
V p1 (m; b) = 
pV^ p2 (m  dm; b+ db) + (1  p)V p2 (m; b) : (17)
The value function of a consumer at the beginning of the secondary goods market, (16), is given
by the value function of an active consumer times the probability of a consumer being active
in this market, V^ c2 , plus the value function of a passive consumer times the probability of a
consumer being passive, (1  )V c2 . The value function (17) refers to a producer and has a
similar interpretation.
5 Monetary Equilibrium
We focus on symmetric, stationary monetary equilibria, where all agents follow identical strategies
and where real variables are constant over time. Let   B=B 1 denote the gross growth rate of
bonds, and let   M=M 1 denote the gross growth rate of the money supply. In a stationary
monetary equilibrium, the real stock of money must be constant; i.e., M = +1M+1; implying
that  = =+1. Furthermore, the real amount of bonds must be constant; i.e., B =  1B 1,
implying that  = .
Market clearing in the goods market implies that aggregate consumption is equal to aggre-
gate production; i.e., (1  n) [q^c + (1  ) qc] = nqp. Aggregate consumption is given by the
consumption of active consumers times their measure, q^c (1  n) , plus the consumption of pas-
sive consumers times their measure, qc (1  n) (1  ). Aggregate production is given by the
production of producers times their measure, qpn. Again, note that production in the goods
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market does not depend on a producers portfolio, and so all producers produce the same quan-
tity of goods, qp. To make the notation simpler, we omit the subscript c in the consumed
quantities and relabel q^c and qc as q^ and q, respectively. Hence, the market clearing condition
satises
(1  n) [q^ + (1  ) q] = nqp: (18)
In what follows, we focus on two cases. In the rst case, labeled type-I equilibrium, the
constraints (12) and (13) do not bind (i.e., c = p = 0). In the second case, labeled type-II
equilibrium, the producers cash constraint binds and the consumers bond constraint does not
bind (i.e., p > 0 and c = 0). Further below, we calibrate the model to U.S. data and nd that
these are the relevant cases.18
All equilibria involve the derivation of the marginal values of money and bonds from equation
(15). Furthermore, the Kalai equation (10) and the rst-order condition in the secondary bond
market (14) play a key role. This last equation can be written as follows:


(1  )u0 (q^)  1 = p + c (1  ) (1  )u0 (q^) +  ; (19)
where we have used the budget constraint in the goods market; i.e., m + dm (1  ) = pq^, to
replace @q^=@dm =  (1  ).
5.1 Type-I equilibrium
In a type-I equilibrium, an active consumers bond constraint does not bind, and an active
producers cash constraint does not bind. A type-I equilibrium can be characterized by the three
equations stated in Proposition 1. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 A type-I equilibrium is a time-invariant path fq^; q; g satisfying
1 = u0 (q^) (1  ) ; (20)


= (1  n)  u0 (q) +  u0 (q^)  u0 (q)	+ (1  )u0 (q)+ n; (21)


= 1: (22)
Equation (20) is derived from the rst-order condition (19). The meaning of this equation
is that the cost of acquiring one additional unit of money in a meeting in the secondary bond
market has to be equal to its benet.
Equation (21) is derived from the marginal value of money in the secondary bond market.
The right-hand side of (21) is the marginal benet of money at the beginning of the period.
With probability (1  n) , the agent is an active consumer and the marginal benet of money is
u0 (q)+ [u0 (q^)  u0 (q)]. Note that the term [u0 (q^)  u0 (q)] is negative, since an active consumer
holds more money in the goods market. Note further that a consumer with a higher bargaining
18The other possible values of the multipliers (i.e., c > 0 and p = 0) are analyzed in a Supplementary Appendix
that is available on request.
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weight, , holds more money, and so the marginal benet of money is decreasing in . With
probability (1  n) (1  ), the agent is an passive consumer, since he has no match and his
marginal utility is u0 (q). With probability n the agent is a producer and her marginal utility is 1.
The left-hand side of (21) represents the marginal cost of acquiring one additional unit of money
in the primary bond market. Equation (22) is the Fisher equation. It reects the fact that the
benet of taking one additional unit of bonds into the secondary bond market must be equal to
the marginal cost of acquiring it in the primary bond market.
5.2 Type-II equilibrium
In a type-II equilibrium, an active consumers bond constraint does not bind, and an active pro-
ducers cash constraint binds. The following Proposition 2 characterizes the type-II equilibrium.
Proposition 2 A type-II equilibrium is a time-invariant path fq^; q; g satisfying
q^ = (2  ) q; (23)


= (1  n) u0 (q) +  u0 (q^)  u0 (q)	+ (1  )u0 (q)	 (24)
+n

p

(1  ) (1  )u0 (q^) + + (1  p)	 ;


= 1: (25)
To derive equation (23), we compare the budget constraint of an active consumer with the
budget constraint of a passive consumer. Furthermore, we use the fact that a producer transfers
all her money to the active consumer. The interpretations of (24) and (25) are similar to their
counterparts in Proposition 1. It is interesting to compare (24) to its counterpart (21). They are
equal except for the marginal value of money for the producer. In (21), the producers marginal
value of money is 1, while in (24) it is p [(1  ) (1  )u0 (q^) + ] + (1  p) > 1. The reason is
that, in the type-II equilibrium, the producers cash constraint is binding (p > 0), and so the
rate of return on money holdings is strictly positive.
5.3 Regions of Existence
Proposition 3 characterizes two non-overlapping regions in which the two types of equilibria exist.
Let 1 denote the value of  such that q^ = q holds in the type-I equilibrium. Furthermore, let
2 denote the value of  such that equations (21) and (24) hold simultaneously. In the proof of
Proposition 3, we show that such values exist and that they are unique. Furthermore, we show
under which conditions   1  2 <1.
Proposition 3 If 1   < 2, equilibrium prices and quantities are characterized by Proposition
1; and if 2  , they are characterized by Proposition 2.
In the type-I equilibrium (1   < 2), consumers and producers are unconstrained in the
secondary bond market (i.e., c = p = 0). In the type-II equilibrium (2  ), active consumers
13
are unconstrained, but the constraint on money holdings of active producers binds (i.e., c = 0,
p > 0). Thus, in both types of equilibria active consumers do not sell all their bond holdings
and thus the price of bonds in the primary bond market, , must equal the fundamental value of
bonds, =.
Figure 1: Consumed quantities for  = 0 and  > 0:
Figure 1 shows the consumed quantities as a function of .19 For  = 0 and 1 =    < 2,
the economy is in the type-I equilibrium, where active consumers obtain the rst-best quantity;
i.e., q^ = q, while passive consumers obtain q  q. For  > 0 and  < 1   < 2, both
consumption quantities are less than q (see the graph on the right-hand side of Figure 1). For
   < 1, active agents are better o¤by not trading in the secondary bond market; i.e., c < 0.
In this case, the quantities are equal and correspond to the consumption quantities obtained in
the standard Lagos and Wright (2005) framework (see the region labeled LW in the graph on
the right-hand side of Figure 1).20 For increasing values of  , the critical values 1 and 2 both
move to the right. Finally, for 2 <  both quantities are smaller than q
 and decreasing in .
6 Optimal Tax
The main result of our paper is that imposing an FTT in the secondary bond market can be
welfare-increasing. In this section, we show under which conditions this is the case, and we
19Throughout the paper when we consider a change in the FTT, we assume that the additional tax income is
redistributed lump-sum to the agents in the primary bond market. This means from (1), that a change in the FTT
has no e¤ect on the ination rate.
20 In this region, the consumption quantity satises 

= (1  n)u0 (q) + n and q^ = q. The bond price is at its
fundamental value 

= 1:
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provide intuition for the result. Let W be the expected life-time utility of the representative
agent at the end of the period. Then, welfare W can be written as follows:
(1  )W = (1  n) f [u(q^)  q^] + (1  ) [u(q)  q]g+ U(x)  x; (26)
where the term in the curly brackets is an agents expected period utility in the goods market,
and U(x)   x is the agents period utility in the primary bond market. Di¤erentiating (26)
with respect to  yields
1  
1  n
dW
d
= 

u0(q^)  1 dq^
d
+ (1  ) u0(q)  1 dq
d
: (27)
The welfare e¤ect depends on the derivatives dq^d and
dq
d . In the type-I equilibrium, from (20), we
have dq^d =
1
(1 )2u00(q^) < 0, and, from (21), we have
dq
d =   (1 )(1 )2u00(q) > 0. Thus, whether
an FTT is welfare-improving depends on which of the two e¤ects dominates.
Proposition 4 In the type-I equilibrium, if
 (q; q^) =

(   )u00 (q^)
(1  )u00 (q)
 
u0(q)  1
u0(q^)  1

> 1; (28)
then welfare is increasing in  .
Proposition 4 formulates a condition under which it is welfare-improving to increase the FTT
in the type-I equilibrium. In general, the rst term is smaller than 1 and the second term is larger
than 1. The second term approaches innity as q^ ! q, which means that for some preferences
and technology parameters the second term dominates the rst term.21
The search frictions play a crucial role for this result. From (28),  (q; q^) is decreasing in 
and approaches 0 as  ! 1. In the absence of search frictions ( = 1), all consumers trade in
the secondary bond market, and so all consumers obtain the same consumption q^ in the goods
market. In this case, adding an FTT is strictly welfare-decreasing, since it lowers consumption
for all consumers.
This last observation also claries why an FTT can be welfare-increasing. In the type-I
equilibrium, we have q < q^. Increasing  increases q and decreases q^. Thus, the tax has a
redistributional e¤ect. The question is why does it increase q? The reason is straightforward.
The role of the secondary bond market is to allocate idle money from producers to consumers.
In doing so, this market provides insurance to agents against the liquidity shock of becoming a
consumer. The drawback of this insurance is that it reduces the incentive to self-insure against
the liquidity shocks. This lowers the demand for money in the primary bond market, which
depresses its value. This e¤ect can be so strong that it can be optimal to impose an FTT in the
secondary bond market.
21 In particular, consider an initial FTT of  = 0,  < 1 and 1 <  < 2. In this case, we have q^ = q
, and so
this condition is satised, since limq^!q  (q; q) =1.
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7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the role of search frictions for the optimal FTT, the Friedman rule,
and other issues of relevance for our analysis.
Role of search frictions. We have shown above that search frictions are needed in order for
an FTT to be welfare-increasing. In order to verify that search frictions (instead of bargaining
frictions) are necessary for the welfare benet of an FTT, we have also derived a version of the
model where pricing in the secondary bond market is competitive. To mimic search frictions, we
assume that traders have random access to the secondary bond market.22 For this competitive
pricing model and for the type-I equilibrium, we nd a similar condition to condition (28).23
Namely,
 (q; q^) =

u00 (q^)
u00 (q)
 
u0(q)  1
u0(q^)  1

> 1:
The second term is always larger than 1, since consumption with access to this market is larger
than that with no access; i.e., q^ > q. Since u00 (q^) > u00 (q), the above inequality is always satised.
The optimal taxation is dened as the value of  that maximizes ex ante welfare, which is given
by (26). How does the optimal FTT a¤ect the consumed quantities in the goods market, when
we assume that the secondary bond market is competitive? In contrast to Kalai bargaining,
the consumed quantities of active and passive agents equal each other for  = ; i.e., with
competitive pricing and random access to the secondary bond market ( = 1 and  < 1), the
FTT eliminates any consumption variability, which is shown in the left-hand chart of Figure 2.
22For competitive pricing, we assume that n = 0:5: In this case  = p and so consumers and producers have the
same access probability.
23We have rewritten the model assuming competitive pricing and limited participation. For the type-I equi-
librium, we get the same allocation as for the OTC market under Kalai bargaining with  = 1. For the type-II
equilibrium, the expressions are not quite the same, but since we focus on the type-I equilibrium in the calibration,
we do not report this here. The proof is available on request.
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Figure 2: Consumed quantities for  = 1 and  < 1:
The green and red line represent the consumed quantities of active and passive consumers, re-
spectively, for  = (), which is calculated for each ination rate . Note that, for  = ();
we have q^ = q and thus 1 = . The chart on the right-hand side of the above gure shows the
consumed quantities for Kalai bargaining when  < 1. In this case, consumption variability is
also reduced under the optimal tax rate (see the right-hand diagram in Figure 2), but we have
q^ > q.
The Friedman rule and paying interest on money For  = 0 and  = , we have
q = q^ = q (see the graph on the left-hand side of Figure 1). That is, the Friedman rule ( = )
implements the rst-best allocation. In this case, there is obviously no welfare-enhancing role for
an FTT. There is not even a role for a secondary bond market, since holding cash is costless and
agents do not need to economize their cash holdings.
An alternative policy is to pay interest on money, as proposed in Andolfatto (2010). Both
policies enhance the return on holding money and address the problem of an ine¢ ciently low value
of money more directly than an FTT. Both policies, however, require some form of taxation, since
tax income is needed to subsidize the liquid asset. The FTT, in contrast, generates tax income
and, hence, is not subject to this problem. In this paper, we abstract from this well-known result
and ask under which conditions, away from the Friedman rule, can it be welfare-enhancing to
impose a transaction tax.
Pecuniary externality. As discussed in the introduction, it is well-known that a pecuniary
externality is a pricing externality. In a complete market setting, the resulting equilibrium is
still Pareto e¢ cient. In contrast, with incomplete markets the resulting equilibrium might not be
constrained e¢ cient, and government intervention can be welfare-improving (see Greenwald and
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Stiglitz, 1986). In our incomplete market model, there are two pecuniary externalities. First,
when agents acquire money they incur disutility today, but spending and hence consumption
utility occurs in the future. Since agents discount future utilities, they typically underinvest in
money, which results in a value of money that is too low or, equivalently, a price level that is
too high. This is a well-known pecuniary externality that is present in the most basic version of
the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework. In that framework and in our model, the equilibria can
be Pareto-ranked in the gross growth rate of the money supply , and the Friedman rule  = 
implements the rst-best allocation.
We add to this basic setting the opportunity to trade liquid for illiquid assets after observing
the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks in a secondary bond market. Away from the Friedman rule,
this opportunity reduces the value of money even more, since, as explained before, it reduces the
demand for money and hence its value. This second pecuniary externality can be corrected by
an FTT. Another way to look at this second pecuniary externality is that liquidity shares the
characteristics of a public good. Under this view, liquidity is a public good, holding liquidity
is costly, and market participants attempt to free-ride on the liquidity holdings of other market
participants. As a result, there is an underprovision of liquidity.
As mentioned before, the Friedman rule can address both pecuniary externalities as explained
above. Therefore, this paper solves a second-best problem in which a transaction tax can improve
welfare when the Friedman rule is not in place.24
Other assets. Our analysis should apply to any market where an illiquid asset can be traded
for a liquid asset. For simplicity, we call the liquid asset money and the illiquid asset is a risk-free,
one-period, government bond. However, the model can be extended to alternative assets such
as stocks, T-bills, Muni bonds, and corporate bonds. An analysis of corporate bonds would be
of interest, since it would introduce a potential problem of an FTT. An FTT can potentially
adversely a¤ect the primary market by making it more di¢ cult to nance investment projects
by issuing bonds. In such a case, the benets of an FTT need to be compared to the potentially
negative e¤ects on the stock of capital in the economy.
Taxing the producers. We have also studied the case where the FTT is paid by the producer
and not by the consumer. Although some expressions are di¤erent, our results still hold. For
example, conning our analysis to the type-I equilibrium, the equilibrium equations become
1 = u0 (q^)   ; (29)


= (1  n) u0 (q) +  u0 (q^)  u0 (q)	+ (1  )u0 (q)	+ n; (30)


= 1; (31)
24A transaction tax cannot implement the rst-best, unlike monetary policy, because, although it helps with
liquidity provision, it also distorts nancial trading that should have happened.
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where  represents the tax on the producer. It is easy to show that Proposition 4 still holds when
producers bear all the tax burden.25
Societal benets of illiquid bonds. In our model, money and bonds are risk-free nominal
instruments issued by the central bank. They only di¤er in terms of liquidity: the former is a
liquid asset, while the latter is an illiquid asset. Kocherlakota (2003) shows that making bonds
illiquid is an optimal arrangement. The reason is straightforward as explained by Kocherlakota
(2003, p. 184): If bonds are as liquid as money, then people will only hold money if nominal
interest rates are zero. But then the bonds can just be replaced by money: there is no di¤erence
between the two instruments at all.If there is no di¤erence between the two instruments, then
the allocation is una¤ected by the presence of a second instrument, since a change in the stock
of identical nominal assets is neutral in this class of models. Berentsen and Waller (2011) show
that the Kocherlakota (2003) result extends to steady states.
Other reasons for nancial trading. Finally, in their original paper about OTC markets,
Du¢ e et al. (2005) o¤er several reasons of why agents may trade in these markets; i.e., for
liquidity, portfolio diversication, speculation, and hedging. In our paper, the only reason is a
shock to liquidity needs. We believe that adding these additional motives for trading in nancial
markets will a¤ect our results quantitatively but not qualitatively. Furthermore, OTCmarkets are
not only characterized by bilateral trade and private negotiations, but they are also characterized
by intermediation. That is, very often trade does not happen directly between investors, but it
happens through dealers or market-makers. We do not model such intermediation but, from our
analysis, we believe that if such intermediaries lower, but do not eliminate, the trading frictions,
our results are a¤ected quantitatively but not qualitatively.
Market for borrowing Throughout the paper, we assume that liquidity reallocation occurs
through an exchange of a government security for money. In doing so, we have completely
shut down any possibility of the emergence of a private market for borrowing and saving that
reallocates liquidity such as in Berentsen et al. (2007). This missing market raises serious concerns
about the societal benets of an FTT. Could such a market indeed replace our secondary bond
market and make an FTT obsolete?
The answer is no. When agents have limited commitment, a private market for borrowing and
lending does not work well in a low interest rate environment. The reason is that the borrowing
constraint is very tight for low interest rates. This has been demonstrated in Berentsen et al.
(2007). Moreover, Berentsen et al. (2016) calibrate a model with limited commitment to several
developed countries and nd that limited commitment is indeed a serious issue and that it is
visible in the aggregate money demand curve.
25To see this, note that dq^
d
= 1
u00(q^) < 0 from (29), and
dq
d
=   
(1 )u00(q) > 0 from (30). Plugging these terms
into (27) yields 1 
(1 n)
dW
d
=
[u0(q^) 1]
u00(q^)

1  (1 )[u
0(q) 1]
[u0(q^) 1]
u00(q^)
[(1 )+1 ]u00(q)

. Now,
[u0(q^) 1]
u00(q^) < 0. Hence,
dW
d
> 0
i¤ (28) holds.
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In the next section, we will show that the societal benets of an FTT exactly occur at low
interest rates. Therefore, we think that a private market for borrowing and saving would not
a¤ect our qualitative results.
8 Quantitative Analysis
In the theory section, we have shown that it can be welfare-improving to impose an FTT. Such
a tax makes trading in the secondary bond market less attractive, which results in an increase in
the demand for money and its price. The optimal tax rate depends on preferences and technology.
In the following, we calibrate the model to U.S. data to obtain estimates for the optimal FTT.
We choose a model period as one year. The functions u(q), c(q), and U (x) have the forms
u (q) = Aq1 =(1   ), c(q) = q, and U (x) = log(x), where A is a utility parameter and  is
the relative risk aversion. It also measures the elasticity of substitution between consumption
in the goods market and the primary bond market. The parameters to be identied are as
follows: (i) preference parameters: (;A; ); (ii) nancial market parameters: (n; ; ); (iii)
policy parameters: (; ).
To identify these parameters, we use U.S. data from the rst quarter of 1995 to the fourth
quarter of 2013. All data sources are provided in the Appendix. The calibration targets are
shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibration targets for the United States
Target Description Target Value
Average real interest rate 0.021
Average ination rate 0.024
Average velocity of money 6.30
Average elasticity of money demand -0.21 (0.014)
Standard errors in parentheses.
The parameters  and  can be set equal to their targets. The gross growth rate of the
money supply  matches the average change in the consumer price index. The discount factor 
is set such that the models real interest rate matches the real interest rate in the data, which is
measured as the di¤erence between the long-term government bond yield and the change in the
consumer price index.26
The nancial market characteristics are captured by the meeting probabilities  and p and
the bargaining weight . To identify a reasonable estimate for , we need evidence from direct
buyer-seller matching platforms. Direct buyer-seller matching platforms are, for instance, UBS
Bond Port, Liquidnet Fixed Income, and HSBC Credit Place. In 2015, UBS Bond Port reached
a trading volume of more than USD 30 billion with more than 10,000 bonds being tradable.
26Related studies work with the yield on AAA bonds, which consists of bonds with remaining maturities of as
close as possible to 30 years. As we analyse Germany in the robustness section, we decided to use the long-term
government bond yield, which is available for the U.S. and for Germany, and consists of government bonds with a
remaining maturity of 10 years.
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According to ndings of UBS, participants tend to trade at the mid-price, which suggests that
 is close to 0:5.27 In the baseline calibration, we therefore set  = 0:5. We also provide a
robustness check further below by changing  from 0 to 1.
We use the matching function M [n;  (1  n)] = n (1  n) with  2 (0; 2), and we choose
n = 0:5. This implies that the matching probabilities are  = p = =2 2 (0; 1). To identify a
reasonable estimate for , we need evidence of search frictions in the market for U.S. government
securities. According to Du¢ e et al. (2005), search frictions in this type of market are mainly
caused by time delays to contact counterparties. Pontrandolfo (2015) takes a deeper look at this
issue and his methodology suggests that the probability of nding a suitable trading partner is
lower than 1, especially for government bonds that were issued several years in the past. His
methodology suggests that search frictions are signicant, especially for market participants who
would like to trade large quantities.28 In the light of this discussion, we set  = 0:8 in the baseline
calibration. Further below, we provide a robustness check by changing  from 0 to 1.
The parameters  and A, are obtained by matching the velocity of money and the elasticity
of money demand simultaneously. We do this by minimizing the sum of squared di¤erences
between the target values and the respective model-generated moments. Following this calibration
strategy, we are able to hit both targets exactly. The average velocity of money, measured as the
ratio of GDP to M1, is equal to v = 6:30 in the United States.29 The elasticity of money demand
with respect to the long-term government bond yield, estimated by ordinary least squares and a
log-log specication, is equal to { =  0:21.
The models velocity of money is
v =
Y
M 1
=
1 + (1  n) [q^ + (1  ) q]
q
;
which depends on the interest rate in the primary bond market; i.e., i  1=   1, and on  via
the functions q and q^.21 As for the empirical elasticity, the models elasticity of money demand
is estimated by ordinary least squares and a log-log specication.
The targets discussed above, and summarized in Table 1, are su¢ cient to calibrate all but
one parameter: the taxation rate  . To address the question of whether it might be optimal to
set  > 0, we calibrate the model for  = 0 and then calculate the optimal taxation rate .
27This information has been communicated to us, but unfortunately we have no access to the trading data for
that platform.
28We refer to Huber and Kim (2016) for a more detailed discussion about the trading frictions in nancial
markets.
29For the United States, we work with M1 adjusted for retail sweeps, instead of M1. Cynamon et al. (2006)
show that the presence of commercial demand deposit sweep programs leads to an underreporting of transactions
balances in M1. Furthermore, in Berentsen et al. (2015), it is shown that M1 adjusted for retail sweeps represents
the available means of payments in the economy more accurately than M1. As the stock of money in the model
is equal to the stock of means of payments, we map the models money demand to the empirical money demand
adjusted for retail sweeps.
21The models velocity of money is derived as follows. The real output in the goods market is YGM =
(1  n) [m^+ (1  )m], where m^ = q^ and M 1 = m = q, and the real output in the primary bond market
is YPBM = 1 for U (x) = log(x). Accordingly, the total real output of the economy adds up to Y = YGM + YPBM ;
and the model-implied velocity of money is v = Y=M 1.
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Furthermore, we calculate , which is the percentage of total consumption that agents would
be willing to give up in order to be in a steady state with  = , instead of  = 0. Finally, we
are also interested in the share of market-2 consumption that is nanced by the sale of bonds,
dened as
 ()   (q^   q)
q +  (q^   q) :
In particular, we calculate the change in  associated to an increase in  ; i.e., ()=(0)  1.
8.1 Baseline Results - United States
Table 2 presents the results for the baseline calibration and three robustness checks. The robust-
ness checks are dened as follows: in the calibration labeled elasticity, we target an elasticity
of money demand of  0:25, instead of  0:21; in the calibration labeled velocity, we target a
velocity of money demand of 5:0, instead of 6:30; and in the calibration labeled real rate, we
reduce the real interest rate from 0:021 to 0:01.
Table 2: Calibration results for the United Statesa
Description Baseline Elasticity Velocity Real Rate
A utility weight 0.46 0.53 0.53 0.44
 relative risk aversion 0.53 0.45 0.53 0.53
 optimal taxb 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.014
 consumption delta 0.002% 0.002% 0.003% 0.001%
sGM goods market size 0.099 0.103 0.124 0.094
()
(0)  1 decrease in volume -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.19
1(
) critical value 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.997
2(
) critical value 1.119 1.096 1.119 1.129
B() critical value 0.21 0.30 0.25 0.18
aTable 2 displays the calibrated values for the key parameters (A, ), the optimal value for the tax, , and the size of
the goods market, sGM . It also shows the percentage of total consumption, ; that agents would be willing to give up in
order to be in a steady state with  = , instead of  = 0. The table also displays the change in the share of market-2
consumption that is nanced by the sale of bonds, the two critical ination rates, and the critical bond-to-money ratio.
bThe optimal tax  is calculated numerically by searching for the welfare-maximizing value of  , holding all other
parameters at their calibrated values.
For all calibrations, the optimal taxation rate is about 1:6 percent. The gain in total con-
sumption from being in a steady state with  = , as opposed to  = 0, is around 0:002 percent.
The estimates of the model-implied goods market share, sGM , is around 10 percent, which is in
line with related studies.30 Table 2 also shows that levying a transaction tax decreases the share
of market-2 consumption that is nanced by the sale of bonds. In particular, for all calibrations,
 decreases by around 17 percent.
30See for instance Aruoba et al. (2011) and Lagos and Wright (2005).
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Table 2 also reports the critical values 1 (
) and 2 (). To derive these values, we rst
calculate the optimal tax rate  when  is set equal to the target. Then, using ; we can
calculate 1 (
) and 2 () such that in the range 1 () <  < 2 () the type-I equilibrium
exists. From the calibration results presented in Table 2, one can see that a higher elasticity
results in a decrease of 2 (
), while changing the other targets has small e¤ects.
To verify that only the type-I equilibrium is relevant for 1 (
) <  < 2 (), the supply of
bonds in the economy has to be su¢ ciently large. In the Supplementary Appendix, we derive
conditions under which the bond constraint of the consumers binds. We nd that it is not binding
if B > B (), where B is dened as the bond-to-money ratio, B=M , and
B () =(1  ) [u (q^)  u (q)]
q
+
 (q^   q)
q (1  ) :
The quantities q^ and q satisfy (20) and (21). In Table 2, we report the value of B (). It is
around 0:2 for all calibrations. In the data, we interpret the bond-to-money ratio as the ratio of
the total public debt to the M1 money stock, and obtain an average value of B = 4:3.31 Thus,
B > B () is satised, and we are in the type-I equilibrium.32
8.2 The Role of Ination
We now study how the ination rate  a¤ects our results. For this purpose, we calculate the
e¤ect of increasing  on  (Figure 3), and the e¤ect of increasing  on  (Figure 4).
Figure 3:  for increasing values of :
Figure 3 shows that  is increasing in . Note, that the critical ination rates depend on  and,
for each value of , we verify that we are in the type-I equilibrium. For the calibrations labeled
31This denition is in line with Berentsen et al. (2014) and Martin (2015).
32 In contrast to the empirical study of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), our calibration does not
support a liquidity premium for bonds.
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elasticity and real rate, the type-I equilibrium exists for ination rates up to 11 percent,
while, for the other two calibrations, it exists for ination rates of more than 14 percent.
Figure 4:  for increasing values of :
Figure 4 shows that the benet from being in a steady state with  = , as opposed to  = 0, is
also increasing in . A lower velocity of money has the biggest impact on  for higher ination
rates and results in   0:007 percent for  = 1:10.
8.3 The Role of Search and Bargaining Frictions
For the baseline calibration, we have set the matching probabilty to  = 0:8 and the bargaining
power of the consumer to  = 0:5. In what follows, we calculate the optimal FTT for di¤erent
values of these parameters.
Matching probability Figure 5 plots the change in  as  increases from 0 to 1 for  = 0:5.
Figure 6 plots how much consumption the representative consumer would be willing to sacrice
in order to be taxed at the optimal tax rate  relative to  = 0.33
33 In this paragraph, we estimate the models interest rate elasticity of money demand using a point approximation
at the calibrated value of . In Berentsen et al. (2015), it is shown that when estimating the models elasticity
of money demand by ordinary least squares and a log-log specication, the standard errors are small. Thus, a
point approximation at the calibrated value of  represents a reasonable approximation for the models elasticity
of money demand.
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Figure 5:  for increasing values of :
We nd numerically that  is decreasing in . Note that  approaches 0 for  ! 1 for all
calibrations. The reason is that at  = 1, all agents are active and so there is no role for an FTT
(see Section 7 for further details).
Figure 6:  for increasing values of :
Here, we also nd that approaches 0 for  ! 1 for all calibrations. Furthermore,  is maximized
at  = 0:5. At this value, the fraction of consumers who benet from the tax (the passive agents)
equals the fraction of consumers who are penalised (the active agents).
Bargaining power Figure 7 plots the change of  as  increases from 0 to 1 for  = 0:8.
Figure 8 plots how much consumption the representative consumer would be willing to sacrice
in order to be taxed at the optimal tax rate  relative to  = 0, for di¤erent values of .
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Figure 7:  for increasing values of :
We nd numerically that the optimal taxation rate is increasing in . In particular,  increases
to 8 percent for  ! 1 for the baseline calibration. For higher values of , active consumers
obtain a larger fraction of the trade surplus in the secondary bond market and, consequently,
their demand for money decreases in . Thus, the optimal taxation rate is higher to induce agents
to demand more money.
Figure 8:  for increasing values of :
The benet of the optimal tax as measured by  is also increasing in . We obtain   0:059
percent for  ! 1 for the baseline calibration. Thus, the higher the bargaining power of consumers
in the secondary bond market, the higher the optimal FTT and also the benets in terms of
welfare.
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8.4 Germany
As a robustness exercise, we now calibrate our model to Germany. The velocity of money in
Germany (v = 0:70) is substantially lower than that in the United States (v = 6:3). The
elasticity of money demand is similar in both countries. Furthermore, in Germany, the average
ination rate is nearly 1 percent lower, and the real interest rate is 0:5 percent higher than for
the United States. As for the United States, we assume  = 0:8 and  = 0:5. Table 3 summarizes
the calibration targets.
Table 3: Calibration targets for Germany
Target Description Germany
Average real interest rate 0.026
Average ination rate 0.015
Average velocity of money 0.70
Average elasticity of money demand -0.21 (0.079)
Standard errors in parentheses.
As we did for the United States, we calibrate the model to the targets presented in Table 3
and perform three robustness checks, for which we use exactly the same targets as for the United
States.34 Table 4 shows the calibration results for Germany.
Table 4: Results for Germanya
Description Baseline Elasticity Velocity Real Rate
A utility weight 2.82 2.74 0.56 2.26
 relative risk aversion 0.42 0.35 0.48 0.42
 optimal b 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.010
 consumption delta 0.018% 0.021% 0.003% 0.008%
sGM goods market size 0.848 0.893 0.125 0.771
()
(0)  1 decrease in volume -0.17 -0.16 -0.18 -0.20
1(
) critical value 0.982 0.982 0.983 0.995
2(
) critical value 1.081 1.063 1.098 1.096
B() critical value 0.30 0.37 0.25 0.17
aTable 4 is Table 2s counterpart for Germany. For a description of the reported variables, we refer the reader to Table
2.
Table 4 shows that, for all but one calibration, the goods market share is around 85 percent
in Germany. As a consequence, there is a signicantly higher benet from being in a steady
state with  =  as opposed to  = 0. For example, in the baseline calibration, we obtain 
 0:018 percent, which is around ten times higher than that for the United States. The main
34That is, in the calibration labeled elasticity, we target an elasticity of money demand of  0:25; in the
calibration labeled velocity, we target a velocity of money demand of 5:0; and in the calibration labeled real
rate, we target a real interest rate of 0:01.
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reason behind this result is the lower velocity of money, which becomes clear when we look at
the calibration labeled velocity. When we increase the target of the velocity from v = 0:70
to v = 5:0, the benet of raising the tax from zero to  =  drops to   0:003 percent.
Similar to the United States, the share of market-2 consumption that is nanced by the sale
of bonds decreases by around 17 percent when  =  as compared to  = 0. Furthermore,
the optimal taxation rate is around 1:5 percent, which is close to the estimate that we obtain
for the United States. This is mainly because we assume the same nancial market parameters
for both countries; i.e.,  = 0:8 and  = 0:5. Empirically, we obtain for Germany an average
bond-to-money ratio equaling B = 0:50, and hence, for all calibrations presented in Table 4, we
have B > B () at the calibrated value of .
9 Conclusion
We provide a novel justication for imposing a nancial transaction tax (FTT). We develop
the argument in a monetary model where agents hold money to nance stochastic consumption
opportunities. Away from the Friedman rule, the cost of holding money is positive, and in
order to mitigate this ination tax, agents can store their wealth in a nominal interest-bearing
bond instead: This bond cannot be used to pay for consumption, but it can be sold in an OTC
secondary bond market to obtain money when needed.
We show that the availability of this mitigation instrument is not necessarily good for welfare.
On the one hand, agents who liquidate their bonds are able to buy more consumption ex post.
On the other hand, all agents anticipate this and therefore hold less money ex ante, which means
that they will obtain even less consumption in the event that they fail to make a trade in the
secondary bond market. We show that an FTT paid by traders in the secondary bond market
(proportional to the size of the trade) will make it more costly to rely on the secondary bond
market: Therefore, agents will carry more money ex ante and may still be able to attain a high
level of consumption ex post. The FTT can therefore improve welfare in a second-best sense.
We calibrate our model using U.S. and German data, and we nd that an FTT of about 1.6
percent is constrained-optimal for both countries. The optimal tax rate reduces the real volume
of nancial trading by 17 percent. Furthermore, we show that the optimal FTT is decreasing
in the matching probability, so that the optimal FTT is lower for markets with smaller search
frictions.
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10 Appendix
Derivation of c and p. They are dened as follows:
c  V c2 [m+ dm (1  ) ; b  db]  V c2 (m; b) ;
p  V p2 (m  dm; b+ db)  V p2 (m; b) :
Let us start with c and write it as follows,
c = u (q^c) + V3 [m+ dm (1  )  pq^c; b  db]  [u (qc) + V3 (m  pqc; b)] :
The consumers surplus, c, is given by his payo¤ from trading bonds for money in a match in
the secondary bond market, u (q^c) + V3 [m+ dm (1  )  pq^c; b  db], minus his payo¤ from not
trading, u (q) + V3 (m  pqc; b).
If a trade takes place, the consumer receives dm (1  ) units of money for db units of bonds,
and he spends pq^c = m+ dm (1  ) units of money and consumes q^c units of goods. If no trade
takes place in the secondary bond market, the consumer spends pqc = m units of money and
consumes qc units of goods. Simplifying and rearranging terms, the consumers net surplus c
can be rewritten as
c = u (q^c)  u (qc)  db; (32)
where we have used pq^c = pqc + dm (1  ), the consumers value function in the goods market,
V c2 , and the linearity of V3.
Let us now derive p and write
p =  c (qc) + V3 (m  dm + pqc; b+ db)  [ c (qc) + V3 (m+ pqc; b)] :
The producers surplus, p, is given by her payo¤ from trading bonds for money in a match
in the secondary bond market minus her payo¤ from not trading. Note that the quantity of
goods produced by a producer in the goods market is not a¤ected by what happens in the
secondary bond market. This is because the produced quantity depends on the consumers
money holdings, not the producers money holdings. Hence, the producers surplus is  c (qc) +
V3 (m  dm + pqc; b+ db) if she trades in the secondary bond market, while it is c (qc)+V3 (m+ pqc; b)
if she does not.
Rearranging and simplifying terms, we obtain
p = db   dm: (33)
Note that this constraint implies that the interest rate in the secondary bond market is non-
negative, since the interest rate is dbdm   1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Derivation of (20). In a type-I equilibrium, both the producers
cash constraint and the consumers bond constraint are nonbinding in the secondary bond market
(i.e., p = c = 0). In this case, the rst-order condition in the secondary bond market (19)
reduces to 0 = (1  )u0 (q^)  1.
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Derivation of (21). In a type-I equilibrium, the marginal value of money of an agent entering
the secondary bond market, before the realization of the idiosyncratic shock, is
@V1 (m; b)
@m
= (1  n) @V
c
1 (m; b)
@m
+ n
@V p1 (m; b)
@m
:
In the Supplementary Appendix, we show that
@V c1 (m; b)
@m
= 



(1  )u0 (q) + u0 (q^)+ (1  )u0 (q)	 ;
@V p1 (m; b)
@m
= :
Using (4) updated one period, we obtain (21).
Derivation of (22). In a type-I equilibrium, the marginal value of bonds of an agent entering the
secondary bond market, before the realization of the idiosyncratic shock, is
@V1 (m; b)
@b
= (1  n) @V
c
1 (m; b)
@b
+ n
@V p1 (m; b)
@b
:
In the Supplementary Appendix, we show that (1  n) @V c1 (m;b)@b + n
@V p1 (m;b)
@b = . Using (4)
updated one period, we get (22).
Proof of Proposition 2. Derivation of (23). In a type-II equilibrium, a producer is cash-
constrained in the secondary bond market, thus dm = m = M: Also note thatm+(1  ) dm = pq^
andm = pq. Eliminatem in the former equation using the latter, then use dm = m, and rearrange
terms to obtain (23).
Derivation of (24). The marginal value of money of an agent entering the secondary bond market,
before the realization of the idiosyncratic shock, can be written as follows:
@V1 (m; b)
@m
= (1  n) @V
c
1 (m; b)
@m
+ n
@V p1 (m; b)
@m
:
In the Supplementary Appendix, we show that
@V c1 (m; b)
@m
= 



(1  )u0 (q) + u0 (q^)+ (1  )u0 (q)	 ;
@V p1 (m; b)
@m
= 

p

(1  ) (1  )u0 (q^) + + 1  p	 :
Using (4) updated one period, we obtain (24).
Derivation of (25). In a type-II equilibrium, the marginal value of bonds of an agent entering
the secondary bond market, before the realization of the idiosyncratic shock, is
@V1 (m; b)
@b
= (1  n) @V
c
1 (m; b)
@b
+ n
@V p1 (m; b)
@b
:
In the Supplementary Appendix, we show that (1  n) @V c1 (m;b)@b + n
@V p1 (m;b)
@b = . Using (4)
updated one period, we obtain (25).
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Proof of Proposition 3. The critical value 1 is the value of  such that q^ = q in Proposition
1. If q^ = q, from (20) and (21) we have
1 = 
1  n
1   :
Since u0 (q) is strictly decreasing in q, 1 is unique. Note that for  = 0, 1 =  and for  > 0,
we have 1 > .
The critical value 2 is the value of  such that the quantities q and q^ in Proposition 2 are
equal to the respective quantities q and q^ in Proposition 1. To that end, from (20), we have
u0 (q^) (1  ) = 1, which can be solved for q^ () = u0 1
h
(1  ) 1
i
. Next, from (23) we have
q = q^ (2  ) 1. Use the previous expression to replace q^ to obtain q () = q^ () (2  ) 1.
Finally, use these expressions in (21) or (24) to obtain
2 = 

(1  n)



(1  )u0 (q ()) + 
1  

+ (1  )u0 (q ())

+ n

:
Note that 1  2 if 1  (1  ) [1  ]u0 (q ()) + , which requires that the tax is not too
high.
Proof of Proposition 4. Use dq^d =
1
(1 )2u00(q^) and
dq
d =   (1 )(1 )2u00(q) to replace
dq^
d and
dq
d in (27) and rearrange the resulting expression to get
1  
(1  n)
dW
d
= 

u0(q^)  1 1
(1  )2 u00 (q^)

1  (1  ) [u
0(q)  1]
 [u0(q^)  1]
u00 (q^)
(1  )u00 (q)

:
Since  [u0(q^)  1] 1
(1 )2u00(q^) < 0,
dW
d > 0 requires that the term in curly brackets is negative.
This is the case if (28) holds.
Data Source. The data we use for the calibration is downloadable from the St. Louis FRED R
database, except for the consumer price index of Germany, which we downloaded from Bloomberg.
Table A.1 gives a brief overview of the data sources for the United States and Germany.
Table A.1: Data source
Country Description Identier Period Frequency
U.S. Long-term gov. bond yield IRLTLT01USM156N 95:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
U.S. M1 adj. for retail sweeps M1ADJ 95:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
U.S. Nominal GDP GDP 95:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
U.S. Consumer price index CPIAUCSL 95:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
U.S. Total public debt GFDEBTN 95:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
Germany Long-term gov. bond yield IRLTLT01DEM156N 95:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
Germany M1 MYAGM1DEM189S 95:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
Germany Nominal GDP DEUGDPNQDSMEI 95:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
Germany Consumer price index GRCP20YY Index 95:Q1-13:Q4 quarterly
Germany Total public debt GGGDTADEA188N 95:Q1-13:Q4 yearly
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For the consumer price index of Germany, we applied the same aggregation method to cal-
culate the quarterly values as used by the St. Louis FRED R database, which is dened as the
average of the monthly data. For the total public debt of Germany, which is only available at a
yearly frequency, we assumed that the debt level remains unchanged within a year.
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